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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DUTY OF A LANDLORD TO THIRD PERSONS OUTSIDE
THE PREMISES
The recent case of Munger v. Unon Savings & Loan Assn.,1 presents a phase of the rather interesting question, under what factual
circumstances will the courts find that the landlord after having
leased his premises will continue to be held responsible for the
general duties of an occupant in relation to third persons who are
injured outside the premises, at a place where such persons have
a right to be, by a defective condition or nuisance existing on the
premises demised. In tbis case D, occupying a four-story building
adjoining a public street, rented the third and fourth floors of
the building to a tenant to be used for hotel purposes, and retained
the two lower floors for the transaction of its own business. The
contract between the parties provided "that any and all signs
placed in said building must have approval of lessor in writing."
When the tenant showed D a "picture" of a sign which he proposed to erect, D gave its oral approval for the erection of the
sign. Thereafter, a sign was constructed which the tenant negligently fastened to the outside walls of the third story, in plain
view, so that D might easily have seen the manner in which
it was attached to the building.
During a gust of wind, as
P was standing on the sidewalk, the sign fell on her and severely
injured her. P commenced an action against D to recover for
the injuries sustained on the theory that D was in possession of
the premises and was bound not to so use the premises as to
injure a pedestrian using the public street, and that when a
person was so injured, a prnmw facie case of negligence was made
out. Held P recovers. The court stated (1) that the defendant had not given up full control and possession of the
premises used for hotel purposes, as it required the tenant to
obtain permission to erect signs, (2) that the provision requiring
approval of the lessor to be in writing is immaterial where the
rights of a non-negligent third party, on a public street, are involved, (3) that the case falls within the doctrine of Poth v. Dexter
Horton Estate,2 wlnch the court construed to hold that a prima
facie case of negligence has been made out against an owner of a
Wash. 455, 27 Pac. (2d) 709 (1933).
2140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 274 (1926) (noted in 2 Wash. L. Rev. 52).
In this case the plaintiff was struck by a window shade which had fallen
from the upper stories of defendant's building. At the time of the accident, the defendant had leased a part of its building to various tenants
and through the use of independent contractors was renovating a portion
of the rooms of the upper stories. No showing was ever made that the
defendant had made any inspection or that it had approved of the work
done by such contractors. Held: P recovers as the doctrine of res ,psa
loquitur applies. The court said: "The respondent, at the time she was
injured, was upon a public street, at a -place where she had a right to
be, and was guilty of no conduct which in any degree caused or contributed to her injury. The appellant owned and controlled the building
1175
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building when it is shown that an object fell from the upper story
of the building, striking and injuring an innocent pedestrian upon
a public sidewalk, and (4) that it was proper to give an instruction on the subject of res zpsa loquiturunder the facts of this case.
Before entering into the consideration of this case, an attempt
will be made to make a brief summarized survey of the factual
situations wherein the courts have found that the landlord owes
a duty to such third person mentioned above, but no effort will be
made to define the extent of that duty,8 although it is well to bear
in mind that, according to the common law, the landlord's liability
is not an absolute one, but is based on fault.
Where an owner surrenders control of his property by leasing
it to a tenant, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the
tenant and not the landlord is obligated to keep it in a proper
condition, and is prima facte liable for injuries to third persons
from an improper use of the premises. 4 But a landlord will remain
liable, even though he has parted with possession and control, where
at the time of the lease a nuisance exists, or the condition of the
premises is such that they must necessarily become a nuisance by
reasonable user.5 Nor will the landlord be released from such
liability even though the tenant has promised to remove the condition.6 Furthermore, it is generally held that the landlord is
from which the object which injured her came. It was the appellant's
duty to see that the building was so constructed and maintained as not
to be a source of danger to the users of the street in its front. Its neglect
of this duty is negligence. When, therefore, the respondent showed that
the injured respondent was herself without fault, and that the object
which caused the injury came from a building owned by the appellant,
and of which it presumably had the management and control, they made
out a prima facie case, sufficient, without more, to sustain recovery
against it."
3See Harper, The Law of Torts, sec. 102; Restatement of the Law of
Torts, see. 249.
Lippman v. Subway Terminal Corp., 115 Cal. App. 363, 1 Pac. (2d)
1056 (1931) West Chicago Masonic Assn. v. Cohn, 192 Ill. 210, 61 N. E.
439 (1901) Lowell v. Spaulding, 4 Cush (Mass) 277, 50 Am. Dec. 775
(1849) Clancy v. Byrne, 56 N. Y. 129, 15 Am. Rep. 391 (1874) Knight
v. Foster 163 N. C. 329, 79 S.E. 614, 50 L. R. A. (n.s.) 286 (1913) Spokane v. Crane Co., 98 Wash. 49, 167 Pac. 63 (1917) cf. Ward v. Hinklemen, 37 Wash. 375, 79 Pac. 956 (1905) see 1 Tiffany Landlord and Tenant, sees. 96, 97, 101, Restatement of the Law of Torts, sec. 247.
5Dennss v. Orange, 110 Cal. App. 16, 293 Pac. 865 (1930) Cannon City
& C. C. R. Co. v. Oxtoby, 45 Colo. 214, 100 Pac. 1127 (1909) Calway v.
William Schaal & Son, 113 Conn. 586, 155 Atl. 813 (1931) Dalay v. Savage, 145 Mass. 38, 12 N. E. 841 (1887) Haas v. Booth, 182 Mich. 173, 148
N. W 337 (1914) Ishan v.Broderick et al., 89 Minn. 397, 95 N. W 224
(1903) cf. Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889) Larson v.
Calder's Park Co., 54 Utah 325, 180 Pac. 599, 4 A. L. R. 731 (1919) (action
by lessee's business invitee against lessor) Oerter v. Ziegler 59 Wash.
421, 109 Pac. 1058 (1910) (action by lessee's business invitee against
lessor) Rosewell v. Prior 2 Salk. 459, 91 Eng. Reprint 397 (1608)
16
R. C. L. sec. 594.
Updegrajf v. Ottumwa, 210 Iowa 382, 226 N. W 928 (1929) cf. Isham
v. Broderiek, note 5, supra, contra Gunnnell v. Eaier L. R. 10 C. P. 658,
L. T. N. S.835 (1875 Eng.) Shearman & Redfield, on Negligence, vol. 3
(6th ed.), sec. 709-a.
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responsible where the use as contemplated by the parties creates
a nuisance. or a dangerous condition, which injures an innocent
third party, on the ground that the landlord is a party to the
wrong.7 Some courts, however, indicate that in order to make the
landlord liable for such a condition it must be one necessarily
arising from the tenant's ordinary use of the premises for some
purpose for which they were let, unavoidable by reasonable care
on the tenant's part." The better view would seem to be that the
landlord must expect that the premises will be used in any manner
that the terms of the lease would ordinarily impart, and if he could
reasonably foresee that the tenant in doing so would create a
nuisance or dangerous condition, the landlord should be liable, even
if the tenant could prevent the condition by using the property
otherwisef But in the absence of either actual or constructive
notice of the fact that the tenant intends to use the premise for
an inherently dangerous purpose, the landlord should not be liable
if they are so used.10
All of the courts agree that where the landlord has covenanted to
keep the premises in repair, and that where due to his failure to
do so a third person outsade the premses is injured, the landlord
must respond in damages. This result is reached either on the fallacious reasoning of avoiding circuity of action, or upon the proper
ground that in so covenanting the landlord remains under an
obligation to the public while he was in actual possession." But
where the landlord merely reserves a right to enter and make repairs and does not covenant to do so, he has not been held responsible for injuries sustained by third persons due to a lack of repair
of the prenses, on the ground that he was under no duty to repair. '2 Nor is a subsequent oral promise to make repairs sufficient
since the promise is a mere gratuity "a
Calway v. Schaal & Sons, note 5, supra; Helwng v. Jordon,53 Ind. 21,
C
21 Am. Rep. 189 (1876) Maloney v. Hayes, 206 Mass. 1, 91 N. E. 911, 28
L. R. A. (n.s.) 200 (1910) Broumn v. White, 202 Pa. 297, 51 Ati. 962, 58
L. R. A. 321 (1902) Lousville & N. Termznal Co. v. Jacobs, 109 Tenn.
727, 72 S. W 954 (1902) Larson v. Calder's Park Co., note 5, supra, 16
R. C. L. sec 598.
sHoward v. Central Amusement Co., 224 Mass. 344, 112 N. E. 857
(1916) Backer v. Gates, 279 Mo. 630, 216 S. W 775 (1919)
Peterson v.
Bullion-Beck & Champion Min. Co., 33 Utah 20, 91 Pac. 1095, 14 Ann. Gas.
1122 (1907).
'Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325, 7 Atl. 697 (1887) Fow v. Roberts, 108 Pa.
St. 489 (1885) Larson v. Calder'sPark Go., note 5 supra, 26 Mich. L. Rev.
531, 539.
10Godntek v. Cohen, 271 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1934).
2'Denver v. Solomnan, 2 Colo. App. 534, 31 Pac. 507 (1892)

Boyce v.

Talernzan, 183 III. 115, 55 N. E. 703 (1899)
Glidden v. Goodfellow, 124
Minn. 101, 144 N. W 428 (1913)
Burdict v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 396,
20 Am. Rep. 767 (1875) Payne v.Rogers, 2 H. B1. 350, 126 Eng. Reprint
590 (1794) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 384, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 633.
2Boston
v. Gray, 144 Mass. 53, 10 N. E. 509 (1887) see Meyer v. Pepperell Mfg. Co., 112 Me. 265, 119 Atl. 625, 22 N. C. C. A. 695 (1923) but
see Appel v. Muller, 262 N. Y. 278, 186 N. E. 785, 82 A. L. R. 477 (1933).
" Margulies v. Beck, 130 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1911)
Mills v. Temple-West
1 times L. R. (Eng.) 503-D. C. (1885).
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Generally all of the above rules of liability apply where the
landlord gives a renewal lease. 14 So where a tenant creates, during
his term, a nuisance, or dangerous condition, or allows the premises
to become in such dangerous disrepair that by ordinary use after
the landlord gives a renewal or re-lease, an innocent third person
is wrongfully injured, the landlord is held to be responsbile. The
cases reach this result on the ground that the landlord has a right
of re-entry at the expiration of the old lease, and that, therefore,
it is his duty to see that such a condition does not exist. 15 A conflict exists as to whether actual notice of the condition is necessary
at the time of the renewal in order to hold the landlord on this
ground, but it would seem that if this view is correct, the landlord
should be held where by the exercise of due diligence the condition
could have been discovered.' 6 Two jurisdictions have refused to
adopt this legal fiction of re-entry and affirmance of the condition
in case of periodic tenancies, on the ground that there is a continuing interest on the part of the tenant. 1 7 But the transferee of
the reversion is not liable where a nuisance exists at the time
of the transfer because he did not create, nor has he the power
to abate it."' And the landlord has not been held liable where he
has given a renewal before the expiration of the old lease, although
a nuisance exists at that time, since he has no power to put a stop
to the nuisance."9
The above cases, in imposing liability, have done so on the
ground that at some time the landlord has had it within his power
to perform the duty of keeping his property in a condition that
will cause no harm to the public, and that in failing to do so he
is guilty of fault, in short, that he had control of the situation.
Ordinarily when the landlord leases his property, he loses for a
limited period of time his right to possession and control. It was
not strange that the law, motivated by a humane desire to place
liability on the shoulders of the person immediately controlling the
situation, early adopted the view that, in the absence of fault, the
tort liability in respect to the premises passed to the tenant in
occupancy Inasmuch as the law has always allowed an owner to
partially alienate his interest, it seems logically to follow that the
landlord may not have so completely alienated his interest as to
be relieved of his liability in respect to the condition of the
premises. This may be true either because of the peculiar nature
"IIngwersen v. Rankin, 47 N. J. L. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 109 (1885).
1r49 A. L. R. 1418 (cases collected)

leWhzffin v. De Tweede Northwest & P Hypotheekbank, 52 Idaho, 12
Pac. (2d) 271 (1932) Tindin v. Standard Oil Co., 126 N. Y. 514, 24 N. E.
786 (1891) contra State v. Williams, 30 N. J. L. 102 (1862).
Glass v. Colinan, 14 Wash.
"Hull v. Sherrod, 97 Ill.
App. 298 (1901)
635, 45 Pac. 310 (1896), followed in Ward v. Hinkleman, note 4, supra.
" Woran v. Noble, 41 Hun. 398 (1836).
19Cunninghan v. Rogers, 225 Pa. 132, 73 At. 1094 (1909) but this rule
should not apply where the landlord has knowledge.
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of the tenancy or because of simple contract principles. Therefore,
it is necessary in any determination of a landlord's liability
to
20
examine the particular leasehold interest which has passed.
When a landlord leases the various parts of a building to different tenants, it is uniformly held that those parts of the building used in common by all which are necessary to the enjoyment
of the portion leased, do not pass to the tenants, but remain under
the control of the landlord, so that the landlord's tort obligations
in respect to such parts are not altered by the lease.21 And so,
where an occupant of a building would be liable for injuries sustained by a pedestrian due to a defective condition in the building or because of a defect in the sidewalk in front of a building, the landlord is liable if he has leased the building to
different tenants, where he exercises general control of the entire
building. 22 But where the landlord remains in possession of a
portion of a building, leasing the ground floor with an abutting
sidewalk in which there is a coal hole, or similar appurtenance,
the cover of which becomes defective after the execution of the
lease, there is a conflict of authority, as to whether the landlord
should be held liable where a pedestrian is injured, if the appurtenance was used exclusively by the tenant. One group of cases
hold that the tenant, and not the landlord, is liable on the ground
that the tenant is in full possession and control of the defective
premises, so that the landlord would in effect be a trespasser if he
attempted to make any repair.28 The other group of cases hold
the landlord liable on the theory that where an owner or landlord
of a building is granted the privilege of excavating a vault under
the sidewalk of a public thoroughfare, and has constructed in the
sidewalk a grating, an appurtance through which light may enter,
or a coal hole, or other similar device for the admission of air for
the benefit of his premises, he assumes, by implication, the duty
of keeping the sidewalk in as good a condition and as safe for the
public as if such appurtenance had never been made, and that such
duty is imposed by law for the public safety, and that, while the
alienation of the entire premises, either permanently or temporarily, will transfer the duty to the grantee or tenant, still the lease
of a portion only of the premises will not relieve the owner or
26 Mich. L. Rev. 531, 542.
= Young v. Talcott, 114 Conn. 675, 159 Atl. 881 (1932) Wooaman v.
Shepard, 238 Mass. 196, 130 N. E. 194, 13 A. L. R. 982 (1921) Klepper v.
Seymour House Corp., 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29, 62 A. L. R. 955 (1927)
O'Connor v. Andrews, 81 Tex. 28, 16 S. W 628 (1891)
Leuch v. Dessert,
137 Wash. 293, 242 Pac. 14 (1926).
"Kirby v. Boylston Market Assn., 14 Gray (Mass.) 249, 74 Am. Dec.
682 (1859) Jennings v. Van Schazek, 108 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 424, 2 Am.
St. Rep. 459 (1888)
Bruder v. Philadelphta, 302 Pa. 378, 153 Atl. 725
(1931) Poth, v. Dexter Horton Estate, note 2, supra.
I West Chhteago Masontc Assn. -v. Cohn, note 4, supra, Runyon '0. Los
Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 383, 180 Pac. 837 (1919), apparently overruled without mention In Granuccz v. Claasen et al., 204 Cal. 509, 269 Pac. 437, 59
A. L. R. 435 (1928).
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landlord of the duty he owes to the public and place it upon the
tenant of such leased portion of the entire premises, even though
the opening of the sidewalk has no relation to any other part of the
building than that in possession of the tenant.2"
But a pedestrian on a public street who has sustained injuries
occasioned through the defective condition of a part of a building
demised to a tenant cannot hold the tenant's landlord responsible,
where the only ground on which he is sought to be held liable is,
that the landlord is in possession of other portions of the same
building, though not the portion wherein the injury was occasioned.2 5 One who leases a building or a part thereof for business
purposes has the exclusive right, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, to use the outside walls of the portion demised for advertising purposes, or for any purpose which does not
amount to an unreasonable use."6 The landlord is, therefore, not
responsible for the negligence of his tenant in attaching a sign, or
similar appurtenance, in a negligent manner to the portion demised,
2,The leading case expressing this doctrine is Canandasguav. Foster
156 N. Y. 354, 66 Am. St. Rep. 575, 41 L. R. A. 554 (1898) followed in
Seattle v. Puget Sound Improvement Co., 47 Wash. 22, 91 Pac. 255, 125
Am. St. Rep. 884, 12 L. R. A. (n.s.) 949 (1907) criticized in West Chicago

v. Cohn, note 4, supra, Runyon v. Los Angeles, note 23, sipra. For an

excellent discussion of both doctrines see Mitchell v. Thomas, 91 Mont. 370,
8 Pac. (2d) 639 (1932), wherein Justice Matthews, in a concurring opinion, criticizes both views as follows:
"The financially responsible landlord, the owner of the building improved by the construction of any of these appurtenances
or easements to his property who profits by reason of the specialprivilege accorded him and not some fly-by-night tenant whose
whereabouts may be unknown when action is to be brought, and,
if available, may be judgment proof, should respond in damages
for an injury suffered because -that which enhances the value,
the rent, or the rentability of his building, is suffered to become
out of repair. It is to the owner, not the occupant of the building,
that the privilege of using a portion of the sidewalk, for the
benefit of the building is accorded, on the implied condition
that he will not permit the appurtenances to become a public
nuisance by becoming out of repair.
"As between themselves, the landlord and -tenant may, of
course, contract that the latter will make the repairs necessary
but the public cannot be bound by their private contract, and the
landlord cannot evade his public duty by private agreement to
shift it to another, although such a contract may permit the landlord to recoup his losses from his tenant. Why then, should the
mere fact that the owner has leased the building, in whole or in
part, change the rule of liability recognized in all of decisions
in this class of cases? In fact, those decisions which make the
statement that it does, overlook the public duty of the owner and
consider the duty of the landlord and -tenant snter sese."
' Roston v. Gray, note 12, supra; Rice v. White (Mo. Sup.), 239 S. W
141 (1922)
Schroeck v. Reiss, 46 App. Div. 502, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1054
(1900).
"Smith v. Jensen, 156 Ga. 814, 120 S. E. 417 (1932) Snyder v. Kulesh,
163 Iowa 748, 144 N. W' 306 (1913) Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. 1, 12
N. E. 401, 1 Am. St. Rep. 422 (1887) Salinger v. North American Woolen
Mills et al., 70 W Va. 151, 73 S. E. 312 (1911).
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even though other tenants, or the landlord is in possession of the
remainder of the premises, since it is not within his power to restrict the tenant m the use of the portion within the possession of
the tenant.2 7 Consequently, it has been held that a landlord who
let different floors of her building to various tenants who had
exclusive possession and control thereof, was not responsible for
the negligence of a tenant in attaching a sign to the outside walls
of the portion demised, though she had given her consent prior to
its erection, as required by an ordinance, and even though the landlord had retained control of the outside walls for the purpose of
making repairs. To support this decision it was pointed out that
the ordinance was merely a recognition of the landlord's common
law right to grant or withhold consent, that an erection of the
sign was no nuisance in itself, that consent to its erection was no
authorization to do such act in a wrongful manner so that the landlord could be treated as a party to the wrong; that the control
retained arising from the duty to repair did not require the landlord to inspect the building except for the purposes of repair,
and that although the landlord had retained some control of the
outer walls for the purpose of making repairs, the sign had not
fallen because the wall was not kept in repair, but because it was
negligently erected or maintained, and that, therefore, the landlord was guilty of no breach of duty
to the public in giving the
2
tenant exclusive control of the sign
In any determination of a landlord's liability mentioned above, it
is always necessary to ascertain whether or not the occupant is a
tenant. This problem is, perhaps, best illustrated by the roominghouse cases. Where the occupant of a room in a rooming-house
creates a dangerous situation, whereby a person on a public street
is injured, it is held to be a question of fact as to whether the occupant is a lodger or a tenant. In cases the occupant is merely a
lodger, the landlord has a right to enter the room and alleviate
the evil, in which event he should be held responsible, but if the
occupant is a tenant, the landlord has no such control and, therefore, no liability
should attach for his failure to do anything about
29
the condition.
In the principal case, in the absence of the restriction contained
in the lease, it is submitted that if there is a presumption raised
by the doctrine of the Pot&case, supra, it would have been rebutted by the owner merely showing that he had leased the upper
floors of his building to a tenant, since there was no question as to
the manner, or place, in which the sign was fastened and because
- 7 Waiter v. Dennehy, 93 Mo. App. 7 (1902) Di Marco v. Isaac, 74 Misc.
459, 132 N. Y. Supp. 363 (1911) (where the court apparently overlooked
a landlord's liability where a renewal lease is given) Smith v. Miller, 31
Ohio 0. C. 171 (1909).
"Zolezz. v. Bruce-Brown, 243 N. Y. 490, 154 N. E. 535, 49 A. L. R. 1414
(1926) (noted in 26 Mich. L. Rev. 116).
'Wollk v. Pittsburgh Hotels Co., 284 Pa. St. 545, 131 Atl. 537 (1925)
26 Mich. L. Rev. 531, 542.
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a lease ordinarily carries with it the right of exclusive possession
and control 0 The fact that the landlord is in possession of the
lower floors should be immaterial.8 1 Nor should the doctrine expressed in the "coal hole cases"13 2 have any application since here
the tenant creates a condition which the landlord would be powerless to prevent, nor can it be said that the landlord has gamed
anything by its creation. In the absence of the restriction, it would
seem, therefore, to logically follow that the landlord should not be
held responsible.
It is almost too apparent to require comment that the restriction
was imposed by the landlord for its own benefit, and not for the
benefit of the general public. Inasmuch as this retention of control
is for its benefit, since it owes no duty to the public to divest itself
of such control, and as the common law favors complete alienation,
it would seem to follow that the landlord could relieve itself of its
tort obligations owed to the public in respect to the portion let by
merely relinquishing its right of control at any time, in any manner that it should choose. Then, the only basis upon which the
court could have predicated liability would seem to be that, as a
matter of fact, the consent given was not sufficient in form to
evidence a relinquishment of the control retained. This conclusion
could have been possibly reached on one of two gounds either
that the facts showed a retention of control by the landlord, or
that the provision was so broad that the giving of consent to the
erection of the sign did not relieve the landlord of a power to supervise this sign. But it is submitted that the court must have found
on the first ground, as the provision is apparently not as broad as
indicated. When the court found that the landlord had retained
control, of course, the case was clearly brought within the general
principle holding the landlord liable.
In closing, it may be noted that the Washington Court has apparently again given, what is believed, undue weight to the doctrine
of res spsa loquitur in its application. Generally for the doctrine
to apply there must be a concurrence of two facts-first, the accident must be one which does not ordinarily happen unless some
one has been negligent, second, the defendant must have had control over the act causing the accident. The main fact in issue in
the instant case was whether or not the defendant did have control. A study of the counsels' briefs reveals that at the close of
the case, the plaintiff had proved without serious objection, that
the sign had been negligently erected by the tenant on the outside
walls of the portion demised, that the defendant had proved that
it had leased the premises to a tenant who held the same subject
to a restriction in regard to signs, and that the defendant had
offered proof tending to show, at least, that the landlord had given
up control over the sign. As previously stated, if an owner pre2 Notes 25, 27, and 28, supra.

1See Walter v. Dennehy, note 27, supra.
"Seattle v. Puget Sound, note 24, supra.
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sumably has possession and control of his property, such presumption should ordinarily be rebutted when it is proved that he has
leased the premises. But here the defendant, in proving the lease,
proved that it had retained control over the sign. Without the
aid of any presumption whatsoever, the defendant was under a
plain duty to prove that it had relinquished control.13 This it
attempted to do by offering proof, for which the very least that
could be said is, that it tended to prove that fact. Therefore, it
appears that the Washington Court has again allowed the plaintiff
to rely upon the doctrine, as well as upon the evidence, to win his
case.
ORV0
nE K. ALGyE.
23It is submitted that if the above analysis is corrected, it would
appear that the defendant would be obligated to put in an affirmative
defense. Consequently, an instruction on the burden of proof on this
issue would have been proper, and inasmuch as the Washington Court has
in the past used the doctrine of res tpsa loquitur to shift the burden of
proof, instead of the burden of coming forward with the evidence, the
proper result was probably obtained.

